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SUITS AGAINST STATES BY INDIVIDUALS IN
FEDERAL COURTS.
The immunity of Sovereign States from suit, universally
conceded, is variously explained. Writs issuing in the name of

the King, in England, the absurdity of the King's sending a writ
to himself is mentioned as one ground.' Another is said to be the
inconsistency of the idea of supreme executive power with subjection to suit. "All jurisdiction" says Blackstone "implies superiority of power' .. Allied with this notion of the implied inferiority of
a compulsory defendant, to the tribunal compelling him, is that of
the indignity which a state or nation would suffer, in thus being
compelled to submit to a judgment and execution. John Marshall expressed this view when, defending the Constitution in the
Virginia Convention, from the objection that it made possible a suit
against a State by an individual, he remarked "I hope that no gentleman will think that a State will be called at the bar of the Federal court * * It is not natural to suppose that the sovereign
power should be dragged before a court."' And the 11th amendment to the constitution is said by Matthews, J., to have had as
its object, "to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."' Another reason urged in justification of the non-suability
'United States v. Lee, io6 U. S. 196, 2o6.
2Gray J. Briggs v. Light
31 Comm. 241.
43 Elliott, Debates, 555,

Boats, ii Allen, 57, quoted zo6 U. S. 2o6.

quoted in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. i. Yet
in Cohens v. Virginia 6 Wheat. 264, 4o6, Marshall C. J., thinks that "we
must ascribe the amendment (the xith) then, to some other cause than the
dignity of a State," because the State is still suable by other states and nations.

5In re Ayers, 123 W. S. 443. In United States v. Lee, xo6 U.S., 196, 2o6,
the Court finds that the United Stales would not be degraded by being a party
defendant, because it is constantly making itself a plaintiff, a reason that
would apply to States.
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of a nation or state, is that it would embarrass it in the performance
of its duties, to subject it to suit, at the will of individuals, and
to submit the control of its instruments and means of carrying on
the government, and its money and other property, to judicial
tribunals.' The highest interest of the State is to preserve its
liberty with respect to the payment of its debts when they fall
due, and Marshall, C. J., suggests that the reason for the adoption of the 11th amendment was not to protect the dignity of the
States but to prevent their being coerced to pay debts which for
various reasons they might not be willing or conveniently able to
2
pay.
In entering the Union, the States parted with'a portion of
their political power, but they retained the rest, and the rest they
thought quite enough to justify their still calling themselves
"sovereign" and still claiming the customary exemption of a
"sovereign" from suit by individuals.
Despite the assurance of Hamilton, that the constitution
would not make States compellable to pay debts, that "The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the
conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive force";3 despite Madison's declaration in the Virginia Convention that "It is not in the power of individuals to call any
State into court," and Marshall's that though the State may sue
individuals, individuals may not sue States; and that this "par5
tiality" is unavoidable;' as early as 1793, the Supreme Court held
that an individual could maintain assumpsit against a State. The
next year Congress submitted the 11th amendment to the States
and it was on January 8th, 1798, declared ratified. It enacts
that "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or in equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.,"
The language of this amendment seems, with sufficient distinctness, to declare that the judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend, and therefore shall not extend,
to any suit against a state. The principle, quite often announced,
'United States v. Lee, io6 U. S. 196, 2o6.
2Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 4o6.
Federalist, quoted in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. -.
38ist
4
1d.
6
hisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall 419. Cf. New Hampshire v Louisiana, io8
U. S. 76, for a history of the adoption of the i ith amendment.
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that consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction seems however
to be ignored in respect to this subject, for there are intimations
not only that a State can be sued in its own courts, if it consents,
in which case the consent legislatively expressed, creates the
jurisdiction' but that, not limiting its consent, as it may, to suits
in its own courts exclusively,2 it may by virtue of its consent be
sued in the Federal courts. 3 It may thus oddly extend the judicial power of the United States beyond the boundaries defined
in the 11th amendment.
The want of jurisdiction of the Federal courts over suits
against States is not confined to such suits against them as involve
no question arising out of the constitution, the treaties and the
statutes of the United States, that is to suits over which these
courts take jurisdiction because of the character of the plaintiff.
The fact that a violation of its contract, by a law of the defendant
state is alleged' or that the plaintiff is a Federal corporation' will
not justify the entertainment of a suit against a State.
When the State, as plaintiff, either civilly or criminally proceeds against a man, it subjects itself not only to the judgment of
the trial court, concerning all matters arising in the suit, but also
to the judgment of any appellate court, and the fact that ol the appeal or in proceedings in error it appears as a defendant, does not
impair the jurisdiction of the court. The State may be subjected
as defendant in error to the court, for the purpose of defeating a
penalty, or a loss of property improperly imposed by the inferior
court, at its instance. "Nothing," says Marshall, C.J., "is demanded from the State. No claim against it of any description
'Beers v. Arkansas 61 U. S. (2o Howard) 527. Curran v. Arkansas, 56
U. S. (i5Howard) 304; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. i. A suit against a
State by its own citizens is impossible without its consent, independently
of the mith amendment. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 525; Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U. S., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22.
'2Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S., 436; Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590. A
State consenting to be sued in its own courts only, cannot be sued in the
Federal courts.
3Clark v. Barnard, io8 U. S.436. Hans v. Louisiana, 131 U. S. i,Davis
v. Gray, 83 U. S.203.
4Pennoyerv. McConnaughy, i4o U. S. i;Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S.,.
A suit by a citizen against his own State.
5Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S.436.
6
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S.(6 Wheat) 264. Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U. S. i; Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590 Cf. State Bank v. Knoop, 37 U. S.
(16 How.) 369.
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is asserted or presented. The party is not to be restored to the
possession of anything. * * He only asserts the constitutional
right to have his defence examined in the tribunal whose province it is to construe the constitution and laws of the Union."'
When the State or the United States sue a person, they waive
their exemption from. suit so far as to allow a set-off, legal or
equitable, to the extent of the demand made or property claimed
by them as plaintiff.'
A State may doubtless become the owner of a claim formerly
held by one of its citizens, against another State, and may as
owner sue such other state. It cannot however, bring suit in its
name for the citizen, who guarantees it against loss, who controls
the action, and for whom the money received is to be kept by
the attorney-general as special trustee. Although the constitution while giving to the individual the power to sue a state, took
from the state to which be belonged, the power itself to demand
payment from the debtor state by force, the withdrawal by the
l1th amendment of the individuals power to sue the debtor state
did not confer on his own state the power either to sue for him
in the Federal courts, or to resort to force. The object of the
amendment was, says Waite, C. J., to prevent suits not merely
by, but for, the citizens of one State against another State3 , a decision that tallies with the suggestion of Marshall, C. J., that the
object of the amendment was not so much to save the dignity of
a State, as to protect it from compulsory payment of its debts.
The lesion of its-dignity would hardly be more serious, when the
State's claim was acquired from an individual, than when it arose
in some other way.
When is a State sued? The disposition of the Supreme
Court, when the question first presented itself under the 11th
amendment, was, to hold that a State was not sued, unless it was
named as defendant, upon the record. A suit against the Auditor of the State of Ohio was for this reason held not to be a suit
against Ohio.4 The State is a mere abstraction. What really
2'Cohens

v. Virginia, suira.
The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; United States v. Ringgold, 8 Peters, i5o; United
States v. Macdaniel, 7 Peters, 16. Contra, Commonwealth v. Matlack, 4
Dal].3o0
3. Hampshire v. Louisiana, io8 U. S.76.
3New
4

Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738. But a suit against
A. B., governor of a State, is treated as a suit against the State; Madrazo v.
Governor of Georgia, i Pet. 1io;Kentucky v. Dennison, Governor of Ohio,
65 U. S.(24 How.) 66. It is noticeable that the plaintiff in Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 9 Wheat, 738 was not a citizen of a state, or a subject of a
foreign state. It was a corporation created by the United States. How
then did the n th amendment apply?
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exist are the people dwelling on a certain territory, their certain habits of submission to a few of their number, who have
from time to time been vested with political power, these officials,
certain property real and personal, conceived by the people, their
courts and other agents, as belonging to the State. The object of
a suit against a State would be to compel it to pay money, either
on a contract, or for a tort; to compel it to exert its power or to
refrain from exerting its power; e. g. to refrain from asserting
power over a piece of land; or over certain other property, or to
imprison or otherwise penalize a man. The Court would, first, define the duty of the State by its judgment and then it would, if
that duty, whether positive or negative, should remain unperformed, in some way compel performance. Bow would it compel performance? The State is invisible, intangible. It cannot
be imprisoned or hung. It cannot act at all. Only natural persons act. If the Courts order it to give up possession of land to
the plaintiff, this could be obeyed only by natural persons. They
only can have possession, they only can give it up. If the Courts
order it to pay money to the plaintiff, again only natural persons
can handle and pay this money. If the order is, not to compel
citizens to pay a tax, it means again, that individuals acting for
the State, are not to require citizens to pay, and, if they neglect
to pay, to levy on and sell their property. Any judicial decree
therefore which compels the officers of the State to act or abstain
from acting as they would, but for this compulsion; which requires them e. g. to refrain from coercing payment of a tax by an
alternative levy and sale of property of the taxable; from requiring the doing or not doing of an act by an alternative prosecution; is a decree against the State. To enjoin the State from
doing something is to enjoin its officers from doing it. It acts
only through them. If the injunction is disobeyed, although in
form it was directed to the state, and not to them. it will be disobeyed by them, and they "would be amenable to the Court for
contempt."' To command the State to do something, would beto
command its officers to do it. To command, e. g., the State to
give up the possession of a piece of land, is to command its officers
who have charge of it to give it up. Vice versa, to command the
officers to give it up, is to command the State to do so, for the
State has possession only by its officers.
"Inre Ayers, 123 U. S. 443; Fitts v. McGhee,
172 U. S. 148.

reader v. Wadley,

172

U, S., 525; Hark-
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The principle laid down by Marshall, C. J., that a State is
not sued unless it is named as defendant, has in deference to considerations like those just suggested been abandoned. A State may
bea real party although it is not named.' "If" says Matthews, J.,
"the State is named as a defendant, it can only be reached either
by mesne or final process through its officers and agents, and a judgment against it could neither be obtained nor enforced except as
the public conduct and government of the ideal political body called
a state could be reached and affected through its official representatives. A judgment against these latter, in their official and
representative capacity, commanding them to perform official
functions on behalf of the State according to the dictates and decrees of the court, is, if anything can be, a judicial proceeding
against the State itself. If not, it may well be asked, what would
constitute such a proceeding."'
A suit against the treasurer of C"alifornia, as such, by a corporation, which having paid taxes in its judgment improperly assessed, seeks to recover the amount paid from the treasury of the
State, through the act of the treasurer, is a suit against California whose object is to compel the State to keep its contract to
return a sum equivalent to taxes improperly assessed.' A suit
against the Auditor of the State of North Carolina, to compel
him to apply money in the treasury to the payment of bonds, according to the terms of the law under which they were issued,
but which has since, in violation of the contract been unconstitutionally repealed, is a suit to compel specific performance of the
State's.contract, and a suit against the State.' Thie State of
Louisiana contracted to pay certain interest upon its bonds, and
provided a tax the annual proceeds of which were to be applied
to this interest. An amendment to its constitution was subsequently enacted which prevented the application of the proceeds
of the tax, already collected, to the interest. A mandamus to
the State board of Liquidation, composed of the Governor, the
Auditor, the Secretary of State, etc.. commanding them to apply
the proceeds of the tax already collected and lying in the treasury, to the interest, would be virtually a mandamus to the State.

'Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 287; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 413
487,; 2 Cunningham v. Macon etc R. R. Co., 109 U. S. 446.
Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52.
3
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436.
4North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22; Louisiana v. Steele, 134 U.
S. 230.

THE FORUM
It would compel them, as its agents, to do the things which, done,
discharge the State's duty, with the State's means.' After a
State causes the issue of scrip, made receivable for taxes, for
whose payment it also provides a special tax, an act is passed,
preventing the receipt of the scrip for taxes, and the further collection of the special tax. The Federal Court, it is held in Hagood v. Southern,' will not entertain a bill to compel the State
Treasurer and Comptroller General to execute the law under which
the scrip was issued, because the State is the real defendant, and
the things required to be done by the officers defendants, "are the
very things which, when done and performed. constitute a performance of the alleged contract by the State." The Governor of
the State of Georgia under an act of the legislature endorsed
bonds of a railroad company to the amount of $1,950,000. Four
years later under a later act, he endorsed other bonds to the extent of $600,000. The company failing to pay the interest coupons, the Governor, under a power conferred upon him by statute,
took possession of the road. The receiver appointed sold it to
the State of Georgia for $1,000,000. The State has since taken
up the first set of bonds, giving its own instead. The holder of
$19,000 of the second set of bonds, files a bill against the Governor, the Treasurer, the railroad company and others, asking
the court to decree that the purchase by Georgia did not extinguish the mortgage for the $600,000; but that it is now a first
charge on the railroad; for a foreclosure of this mortgage; for a
participation by the holders of the $600,000 in any moneys set apart
to be paid to the holders of the bonds of the State issued as substitutes for the bonds of the railroad; and for a decree forbidding
the State Treasurer to pay the coupons of the State's bonds. The
bill is dismissed as being to all intents, a suit against the State.
"No foreclosure suit," says Miller, J,, "can be sustained without
the state, because she has the legal title to the property, and the
purchaser under a foreclosure decree would get no title in the
absence of the State. The State is in the actual possession of the
property and the Court can deliver no possession to the purchaser.
The entire interest adverse to plaintiff in this suit'is the inter'Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.7TI.
7 U. S. 52. Remarks are made upon the fact that the State denied
the original validity of the scrip, but the State was none the more a party
because of the denial than if the soundness of the scrip had been fully conceded.
21
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est of the State of Georgia, in the property, of which she has
both the title and possession".'
We must not suppose that the principle of these decisions is
consistently adhered to. A township of the State of Missouri
was authorized to issue bonds, and certain taxes were provided
as a source of payment of them. Subsequently this law was repealed, and another method of payment not substantially equivalent, was substituted. On the application of a creditor, the Federal Court issued a mandamus, commanding the judges of the
county court to levy a tax on all the real and personal property
of the township, according to the provisions of the repealed law.
The later act, holds the court, is, as to the plaintiff, null and void,
and "the laws of Missouri, for the collection of'the tax necessary
to pay his judgment, in force at the time when it was rendered
continue to be and are still in force for that purpose"'
In some of the cases cited, the defendants would have been
compellable to do what the plaintiff sought to compel them to do,
if the State had not passed a law virtually or formally forbidding
them to do so. This law was held to constitute them the agent
of the State, in refusing to do what they were alleged to have refused to do, and for this reason the attempt to compel them to
do it, was deemed an attempt to compel the State to do it. In
Louisiana v. Jume it was said that the relief asked would require the officers to act contrary to the positive orders of the supreme political power of the State, whose creatures they are, and
' '4
to which they are ultimately responsible in law for what they do.
If the later act were treated as void, the earlier act would express
the State's will, with respect to its affairs, and to compel them to
perform that will would hardly be to compel the State, Louisiana v. Jumel, and similar cases, treat the later act, although unconstitutional, as expressive of the State's will, so that, to compel
execution of the earlier act is to compel the State to do what it
has willed not to do. It might be surprising, therefore, to discover that in another set of cases, the position is taken that an
unconstitutional law is not the will of the State. A specimen
of this class of cases is Poindexter v. Greenhow.'
Bonds had
'Cunningham v. Macon, etc., R. R. Co., io9 U. S. 446.
2Seibert v. Lews, 122 U. S. 284.
3107 U. S. 71.
4
Quoted in Hagood v. Southern 117 U. S. 5z.
5114 U. S. 570. Cf. Seibert v. Lewis. 122 U. S. 284; Board of Liquida
tion v. McComb, 92 U. S 531.
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been issued by the State of Virginia, the coupons of which were
declared by statute receivable in payment of taxes. A later act
required the tax officers to collect all taxes in gold, silver and
United States currency. The defendant, the treasurer of the
city of Richmond, refusing the tender of coupons, levied on an
office desk. The plaintiff then brought an action of detinue.
To the defendant's contention that in levying on the desk, he
was carrying out the commands of the State expressed in its
later statute, Matthews. J., said, "That, it is true is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but it is not a law of
the State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law, for
it cannot, and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contempla*
He [the de*
*
tion of law, has not done.
and, conof
his
official
character;
fendant] stands, then, stripped
fessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's rights, for which he
must personally answer, he is without defence." ' If this principle is sound, if every unconstitutional law of a State is to be
deemed as if it had not been passed; as no law; then to compel
in any case an officer to do, or to refrain from doing, what, but
for this void law it would be his duty, toward the State even, to
do or refrain from, could never be to compel the State. The suit
against him could never be a suit against the State. The only
question would be whether, the officer's duty being measured by
the constitution and valid laws, it is of such a nature that the
officer should be compelled to perform it, either by mandamus or
injunction at the suit of an individual.
The object of some suits against individuals is to recover
from them chattels or land improperly in' their possession. A
State can have possession of land, only by means of officers or
agents. To oust them is to oust the State, just as ouster of a
tenant by one claiming adversely to the title of the landlord is
ouster of the landlord. Let us suppose that the State is in possession of a tract by its agent A. If A is expelled the state is
expelled. But, the State may cause B, another agent, if he can,
to get posession. If he gains possession he may be expelled. If
every successive agent is expelled, the State surely is excluded
likewise from the possession. The fact that a judgment against
A or B, will not be treated by the Courts as a judgment against
'The same view that the later act being void, the former act manifests
the will of the State, and therefore the duty of the officer towards individuals, recurs in Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. I.

34
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the State, nor therefore as conclusive against it' does not prevent
the expulsion of the State's officer or agent from depriving the
State also of possession for a time at least, and until the same or
some other officer shall peaceably or forcibly, or by means of an
action in the name of the State as plaintiff, regain the possession.
This deprival might last for months or years. It is evident then
that to pennit an ejectment or detinue against an officer of the
State is virtually to permit a suit against the State. But, it has
been held that an ejectment against an officer of the United States'
or of a State' who holds land for the Union or the State, and who
defends on the ground that his possession is his principal, possession, may nevertheless be sustained.
In Stanley v. Schwalby' an action of trespass to try the
title to land in San Antonio, Texas, occupiedas a military post,
was brought in the State Court, against Stanley and others,
officers of the army who were holding it under the authority
of the United States. The title of the United States was invalid as against the plaintiff, unless it had been perfected by
adverse possession under the Texas statute of limitations. The
State Court having decided the title of the United States to
be invalid, their judgment was reversed, on error, in the Supreme Court.
That Court apparently, conceded that since
the suit was against their officers, and not the United States,
the Texas Courts had jurisdiction. It held however, that since
the plaintiff could at any time have within the statutory period,
sued such officers as were in possession, the statute of limitation
ran against him; and hence the United States had acquired the
ownership of the land. Gen. Stanley had, so far as appears, not
been in possession for the necessary time, but other 6fficers who
had preceded him, and he, together, had had this possession.
This possession was held to have been the possession of the United
States for which it became and was a good title. It is clear then,
that to have deprived any of the officers of the possession, would
have been to deprive the United States of it, and to have prevented the perfecting of their title. If this possession had been
lost by ejectment, the United States would have lost their inchoate
'Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204; United States v. Lee, o6 U. S. 196.
2United States v. Lee, xo6 U:S. 196; Grisar v. McDowell, 6 Wall. '363.
3Tindal v. Wesley 167 U. S. 204. The ejectment was against the Secretary of State of South Carolina, and his agent, who, for the State had possession.
4147 U. S. 508.
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ownership. "Inasmuch" says Fuller C. J., "as an action could
have been brought at any time, after adverse possession was taken,
against the agents of the government, through whom that [i. e.
the taking of possession] was done, and by whom it was retained,
the objection cannot be raised against them [the officers] that the
statute could not run, because of inability to sue." It seems
therefore that an ejectment against officers of a State or the United
States, is virtually an ejectment against their principal. It takes
from their principal the possession, and all the rights incident to
possession.
As the possession of the land could be recovered, if taken by
the State through some officer, so the officers of the State, e.g. the
Governor, the Secretary of State, the Treasurer, composing a
board of land commissioners, may be enjoined from selling the
land, already sold by the State to the plaintiff, so as to cast a
cloud on his title.' It is decided however that the State having
caused a sale of lands in satisfaction of an unconstitutional tax,
and having itself become the purchaser, the title of the State
would not be set aside under a bill against the auditor general of
the State and the county treasurer because, apparently, a decree
would have no 'effect, the State not being a party. ' An ejectment
against officers would oust them, and ipso facto the State. It
would have effect, too much indeed. But a decree that the State
title is bad, the State not being a party, would not bind it, and
would be effectless.
What is true of land is true of personality. A desk being
levied on by a tax collector, under a void State tax law, can be
recovered from him, though he holds it for the State, and for the
purpose of selling it in order to raise the tax.3 A sum of money
belonging to the Bank of the United States being about to be
taken from it under a void tax law of the State of Ohio, the taking
of it by the State auditor, was enjoined or, it having been taken,
the return of the specific money taken was decreed by the Court in
'Pennoyer v. McConnaghy, 140 U. S.'. In Davis v. Gray, 83 U. S. 203,
after Texas had granted to a railroad the right to select alternate tracts if
land alonz its road, a constitutional amendment ordered the land open for

settlement. A bill being filed by the receiver of the railroad to enjoin the
governor and the commissioner of the land office from issuing patents to
settlers, the injunction was granted. The amendment was held to violate the

State's contract.
2

Chandler v Dix, i94 U. S. 590.
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 271.

3
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a bill making the auditor the defendant.'
If, in the, execution
of the dispensary law of South Carolina a constable seizes liquor
brought into the state by a citizen, a suit against him for damages will not be a suit against the State. A wrong having been
done to the property of the plaintiff, the constable is personally
liable.2 Generally, if what would be a tort if no constitutional
law warranted it, is about to be committed on property or person
by an officer under an unconstitutional law, it may be prevented
by injunction, or the property may be recovered, or damages may
be obtained.'
It has been said that "there is no distinction between suits
against the government directly, and suits against its property.'
If a vessel captured for running the blockade by officers of the
United States collides with another, through the negligence of
the officers, the claim for damages cannot be enforced in admiralty
by a proceeding in rem.against it,unless theUnited States consent.5
In the case referred to, the title of the United States was a point
to be decided. A libel was filed in admiralty to ascertain whether
the vessel had been running the blockade. If the principle that
a suit against the property of a State is equivalent.toa suit against
the State, means merely that a suit against what the plaintiff con.
cedes to be the property of the State, is equivalent to a suit against
the State, it has little value. To be useful, it must mean that
when the property is alleged and proven to be claimed by the
State, and to be in the possession of the defendant because of said
claim, the suit against it is to be deemed a suit against the State.
In Belknap v. Schild' a bill was filed against the commodore of
the United States and other officers who were in possession of,
and were using, a certain caisson gate, seeking the destruction of
the gate, an account of the profits from its use, etc., and an injunction against the further use of it, on the ground that it in'Osborn v. Bank of United States 22 U. S. (9 Wheat) 738; McGahey v.
Virginia, 135 U. S. 66z, 684; Cf. Jefferson 13ranch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U. S.
(i Black)
436.
2
Scott v. Donald 165 U. S. 58.
'McGahev v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 6S4 . Cunningham v. Mlacon, ete.
R. R. Co., io9 U. S. 446, 452. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 525. Tindal v.
Wesley, 167 U. S. 204. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U. S. (9
Wheat)
738.
4
The Siren, 7 Wall 152; Stanley vs. Schwalby, 147 U. S., 508; Belknap
vs. Schild,
i61 U. S. io.
5
The Siren, 7 Wall. 152. But when the United States procures a condemnation and sale of the vessel as lawful prize, the damages for the collision will be paid from the proceeds.
6161 U. S. io.
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fringed a patent of the plaintiff. Conceding the liability of the
defendants to account, the Supreme Court denied the power to
enjoin against the further use of the gate, or to compel the destruction of it, because to forbid the further use of it by the officer, was practically to forbid the United States to make further
use of it. "The United States could not hold or use it except
through officers and agents." Is there however, any essential difference between depriving the officers of the United States of the
possession of a piece of land, and depriving them of the possesssion of a caisson gate? If, of the latter, the United States is in
possession, because its officers are, so are they of the former. If
to deprive the officers of the caisson gate is to deprive the United
States, so is depriving the officers of a piece of land, depriving
the United States. The Court concedes that the United States
has no more right to infringe a patent than an individual. They
have no more right to continue to use a caisson gate in whose
making a patent has been infringed, than they have to continue
to occupy a tract of land which belongs to another. The Court
adverts to the fact that the material of which the gate is made
belongs to the United States. But how is that decisive of anything? The ownership of itdoes not entitle the government to use it
any more than it would have been entitled had the gate belonged
to another. The logic of the decision is, the possession and use
by Commodore Belknap of the gate, are the possession and uhe
of the United States; to prohibit the continuance of his possession and use, is to prohibit theirs. The injunction therefore,
would virtually be an injunction against the United States, a
logic transparently inconsistent with that of United States v. Lee,'
and Tindal v. Wesley. 2 The Court concedes the liability of the
officers to account to the plaintiff. But, such liability acts as a
deterrent from their using the caisson gate. If no officer can use
it, without this liability; all officers will be unwilling to use it.
If they refuse to use it. the United States loses the use of it.
The liability to make compensation may be as restraining a fact,
as is the liability to the penalties for contempt, when an injunction is broken.
The State may direct certain of its officers to institute suits
for certain purposes, which are or are alleged to be unconstitutional. May the federal courts enjoin them against the institulio6 U. S. 196.
-3167 U. S. 204.
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tion of such suits ? Virginia, having made certain coupons tenderable in payment of taxes, by a subsequent law made provisions
which tended seriously to lessen the value of this right. Suits
were directed to be brought against those who tendered payment
of taxes in these coupons, in which suits onerous burdens of
proof of genuineness of the coupons were put on the defendants.
A bill was filed by the holder of many of these coupons, asking
that the attorney general, the auditor, and other officers be enjoined against instituting these suits. To enjoin them, it was
held, was virtually to enjoin the State.
"How else," asks Matthews J, "can the State be forbidden by judicial process to bring
actions in its name, except by constraining the conduct of its officers, its attorneys and its agents ? And if all such officers, attorneys and agents are personally subjected to the process of the
court, so as to forbid their acting in its behalf, how can it be said
that the State itself is not subjected to the jurisdiction of'the
court as an actual and real defendant ? " ' We have already suggested that if successive injunctions against officers virtually reduce the State itself, which can act only through them, to impotence, and are therefore virtually injunctions against the State,
ejectments against successive officers of the State would virtually
be ejectments against the State; bu.t Matthews J. intrepidly cites
United States vs. Lee,' insensible to the analogies between it and
the case before him. The suits against which in In re Ayers, the
injunction was sought, were civil. But, an injunction against
the attorney general's or other officer's beginning or prosecuting
criminal suits would.- for the same reason, be an injunction against
the State. 3 Yet the principle is not applied with consistency, for
at times, federal courts discharge prisoners held for trial under
State laws by habeqs corpus proceedings.4 A Nebraska law fixed
the rates of railroad charges for transportation, and prescribed
penalties for the exceeding of them. Stockholders of a railroad
company affected by it, filed a bill against the company, the State
Board of Transportation, including the attorney general, praying
for an injunction against the corporation's publishing the rates
prescribed, and against the State officer's taking measures to en-

'In
re Ayers,
2

123 U.S.. 443; 497.
io6 U. S., 196.
:Fitts vs. McGhee, 172 U. S., 525. fIarkrader vs. Wadley, 172 W.S.14 8.
4
Fitts vs. McGhee, 172 U. S., 525. Ia re Neagle, 135 U. S.x. Ex-parte
Milligan, 71 W.S. z. Tindal vs. Wesley. 167 W. S. 204.
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force the rates, and against the attorney general's bringing suits
to enforce the penalties. The court satisfied itself that the bill
did not make the State a defendant.'
The value of the principle that officers of the State cannot be
compelled by federal courts to refrain from prosecution is not apparent. These courts could in no case thus compel the officers
-unless satisfied that there was no warrant in the State's law for
such prosecution, or that the State's law was unconstitutional and
void. If the State does not authorize prosecutions the prohibition
of them could not be regarded as a prohibition directed against the
State. If the State authorizes them by an unconstitutional law,
the defendant, if convicted, could appeal to a federal court, the
supreme court, or any other court endowed by lawwith appellate
jurisdiction, and the conviciion could be set aside. An injunction would be a kind of anticipatory appeal, for the object of both
it and ihe appeal, would be to procure the judgment ofthe federal court upon the validity of the law, and therefore upon the validity of the actual or of the anticipated conviction.
A State may create a corporation, and become the owner of
shares of stock in it, along with natural persons. A suit against
the corporation would not be deemed a suit against the State. "The
State does not," says Marshall C. J., "by becoming a corporator,
identify itself with the corporation. The Planters' Bank of Georgia is not the State of Georgia although the State holds an interest in it." 2 The State may erect the "president and directors" of
a bank into a corporation, itself however owning all the property
The bank could be sued in a federal court.'
of the bank.
"When a government," says the Court, "becomes a partner in
any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character and takes
that of a private citizen," a remarkable kenosis surely. Perhaps
what is meant is that the sovereign State impliedly consents to
be treated as any private citizen, quoad the business and there.
fore to be sued. It is extremely difficult to see how, if a State
chooses, instead of using an individual officer, to create a corpora-

Prout vs. Starr, z88 U. S., 537. In Smyth vs. Ames, 169 U. S., 466, and
Reagan vs. Farmers Loan Co.; 154 U. S., 362, injunctions against the institution
of suits were promulged without ccmpunction.
2
Bank of United States vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia 22 U.S., (9 Wheat)
1904.
3Bank of Kentucky vs. Wister, 2 Peters, 38. A suit against a railroad
corporation is not prevented by the fact that the State holds shares of its
stock; Louisville R.R. Co., vs. Letson; 43 U.S. (2 Howard) 497.
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tion, to perforin any of the work that it undertakes, this corporate
agent should be suable, and the property in its possession, which
is the State's, be subject to levy and sale in execution, while, had
a so-called officer been appointed without incorporation to do the
same work, and take control of the same property, no suit could
have been brought against him or it.
The subordinate political corporations of a State, its counties,'
townships, cities, towns, may make contracts and commit torts.
Suits against them are not treated as suits against the State.
They may be entertained in the federal courts, despite the 11th
amendment. It has not been understood that the immunity of a
state or nation from suit by its own subjects or citizens, extends
to its municipal subdivisions.
The collection of a tax without the consent of the person
taxed involves the taking of his property. If the State has no
right to impose the tax, if, e.g., the State having validly stipulated not to impose a tax on a corporation, imposes one, in violation of its contract, the federal courts will enjoin the State auditors, and the county collectors, or other officers concerned in the
collection of this tax, at the suit of the stockholders of the corporation. 2 So, although the State, having agreed to receive its
coupons in payment of taxes, subsequently withdraws this capacity from the coupons, a tender of such coupons will extinguish
.the taxes and the auditor of public accounts will be enjoined
from proceedings to assess a higher rate of taxes, the penalty
under the later act, for not paying the taxes in money of the
United States.'
A State in order to induce a certain class; of creditors to sacrifice 40 per cent. of their debts, may provide for the exchange
of their bonds with new bonds for payment of 60 per cent. of the
former, and may establish a certain tax, whose yield shall be employed in paying the interest and finally the principal of the new
'Lincoln County vs. Lufning, 133 U. S. 529.
2
Tomlinson vs. Branch, 82 U. S. 460. Cf. Litchfield vs. County of Webster, iot U. S., 773. In Dodge vs. Woolsey, 59 U. S.(ra How.)331, the court
enjoined a tax collector from distraining for an unconstitutional tax imposed on a State bank.
3Allen vs. B. & 0. R. R., 114 U. S. 31j. A bill against the auditor of a
State to enjoin him from certifying an assessment for the year upon a railroad
company to the auditors of the several counties of the State because the assessment will result in an unconstitutional interference with commerce
among the States and is a violation of the 14 th amendment, will be sustained. Fargo vs. Hart, 193 U.'S. 490.
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bonds. A part of the consideration for the surrender by creditors
under this arrangement, of old bonds for new, is the confinement
of the benefit of it to them. Iii making the exchange they acquire aright that no other creditors, who do not similarly sacrifice 40 per cent of their claims, shall receive any of the new bonds
with the right to payment from the proceeds of the special tax;
and a later law authorizing other creditors to receive some of
these bonds, dollar for dollar, is unconstitutional and void. The
federal court therefore will perpetually enjoin the Board of
Liquidation of the State, composed of the Governor and other
State officers, fromdelivering any of the bonds to other classes
of creditors, except at the rate of $60 of the bonds for $100 of the
debt. Under the former law it was a "plain official duty requiring no discretion" to refuse to dispose of the bonds in any other
way, and a suit to compel the performance of this duty, whether
1
by injunction or mandamus is not a suit against the State. The
State can act only through officers and to prevent their doing as
they are by it directed to do, is virtually to prevent the State's
doing as it will. But this difficulty is overcome to the satisfaction
of the court, by the suggestion that the later act being null, the
State never formed any other will than that expressed in its
original law.
A suit against the railroad commission of Nebraska to restrain them from enforcing a statute of the State prescribing
rates of charge so low as to amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law, is not a siit
against the State. The court may forbid the commission to hear
and determine any complaints against the railroad, and to institute any actions or proceedings for the violation by the railroad
of the act.2 When the State law authorizes the railroad commission to fix the rates and directs that suits shall be brought for
penalties for exceeding the rate fixed, the federal court will entertain a bill in equity against the commission, to restrain them
from bringing suits for the non-observance of the prescribed rates
and certifying any copies of the orders, tariffs, or circulars. if the
rates fixed are so low as to amount to a violation of the contract
The State is not virtubetween the State and the corporation.
ally a defendant. 3 That is, the State delegates its power to fix
'Board
of Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 U. S. 531 .
2
Smith vs. Ames, -69 U. S., 466.
3
Reagan vs. Farmers Loan Company, 154 U. S., 362.
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tariffs to a commission; the tariffs are fixed but the steps needful
to make them obligatory upon the corporation, and to compel it
to obey, may be prohibited without prohibiting the State. In an
earlier part of this article, we have seen cases in which compelling certain officers of a State to do certain acts was held equivalent to compelling the State to do them. But a State can be compelled to abstain from acting as well as to act, and as it acts only
by agents, to compel them to refrain is as much to compel it to
refrain as to compel them to act is to compel it to act.
The sheriff is an executive officer of a State. He carries out
the commands that he receives from its courts. An attachment
of him by a federal court, which has appointed a receiver of a
railroad, for taking in execution property of the railroad company
without the attaching court's leave, is not a suit against the
State.'
A survey of the cases, and of the reasonings of the courts
too painfully discloses the absence of a clear and definite
criterion for deciding when a suit is to be deemed a suit against
a State. It need not be named as defendant. Its agents or officers may be §o far identified with it, that a suit against them will
be virtually a suit against it. Whether they are or not, ought
not to depend on their dignity. There is no valid reason for saying that the governor is the State any more than that the officers
or agents are. The nature of the right contested is a better
test. If the State will be deprived of the possession of property
which it holds through the defendant, if the plaintiff prevails; if
a State statute will be explicitly declared null and its execution
by the appropriate officer arrested, if the plaintiff is to succeed,
the suit is practically a suit against the State. But neither these
criteria, nor any other, can be found consistently enforced in the
decisions.
WILLIAm TRICKE'-TT.
1

Ex-parte Tyler, x49 W.S., 164.
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MOOT COURT.
JOHN MALCOLM'S ESTATE.
Will-Proper Signing thereof-Meaning of the Statute.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Malcolm, on July 3rd, 19o5, made a will devising all his land and personalty to his wife Jane. The paper on which it was writtenlay over another
sheet, the lower end of which projected a half an inch below that lying on
it. The will coveted all the sheet but a space about one-third of an inch
wide, and Malcolm not perceiving that he was writing on another sheet
signed the will on the lower sheet. His eyesight was not rood. he was ill
and it was twilight. He left the table where he had written to find an envelope in which to put the will, but in going upstairs, he stumbled, fell downstairs and broke his neck. His collateral heirs were his two brotl-ers. The
father was also alive. The will is offered for probate to the register, who
admits it to probate. Appeal to Orphans' Court.
Forsyth for the appellant.
No writing of a testamentary character can be admitted to probate in
Pa. unless it is signed by the testator at the end thereof, unless the person
making the same shall be prevented by the extremity of his last sickness:
Act of April 8, 1833; P. & L. Col. 1440; Snyder vs Bull 17 Pa. 54; Hays vs
Harder, 6 Pa. 409.
Otto for the appellee.
Toe intention of the testator should be given the greatest consideration.
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 30 p. 572.
The end of the will within the meaning of the Act is not the physical
end but the end in the sense of a termination of the testamentary act:
Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
KLEEMANN, J:-It was clearly the intention of the testator to devise
all his land and personalty to his wife. He evidently thought he was signing
his name on the sheet that he had made his will. He believed that the space
which protruded half an inch was part of the sheet on which he had been
writing, and signed his name thereto. He was ill at the time and his eyesight was not good. It was twilight when he wrote the instrument. All
these circumstances tended toward his making the mistake of signing on the
other sheet. The intention of the testator should be given consideration in
deciding this case. The Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 3o, p. 572, reads:
"In whatever langu-Age wills may be couched or however incorrectly and
bunglingly drawn, if they are duly executed and the intention of the testator
can be ascertained, they are v.alid and effectual to pass property of any kind."
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In our opinion the will was duly executed, and signed at the end thereof.
The end of the will within the meaning of the Act of 1833 is not the physical
end: hut the end in the sense of a termination of the testamentary act:
Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381.

The rule in Pennsylvania is that a will signed at the end of the obviously
inherent sense, though not at the end in point of space, is "signed at the end
thereof," within the meaning of the statute.
In a late Penna. case, Morrow's Estate, 204 Pa. 479, the question was
raised whether the fact of the presence of a blank space of two lines at the
foot of the first page of the paper rendered it inoperative as a will. The
court held not. So where the whole of the disposing portion of a will written
on the first page of a sheet of foolscap; the second and third pages were
blank; and the attestation clause with the signatures of the testator and witnesses were on the fourth page, it was held there was a good execution: In
re Goods of Fuller, L. R. Probate (1892), 377- "An instrument is signed at
the end," said Mr. Justice Leonard, in re Gilman, 38 Barbour, 364, "when
nothing intervenes between the instrumentand the subscription. Who shall
undertake judicially to say that the subscription shall be one-eighth of an
inch, half an inch, two inches or ten inches from the last line of the instrument? The distance from the last line has not been fixed by statute. The
place named by the statute is the end." The result of the authorities is
summed up by Underhill on Wills, sec. j85, by the statement that the interposition of a blank space between the disposing portion of the will, and the
testator's name is never material.
We think a physical annexation of the two sheets of paper unnecessary.
Without a doubt, if, by the use of a little mucilage, the sheets had been
pasted together as they lay, the lower sheet projecting a half an inch below
that lying on it, the will would be valid. If that is so, we can see no reason
why the instrument, even though the sheets be not fastened together, would
not operate as a will as long as the testator intended that his signature
should be the completion of the will.
The fact that Malcolm signed his name by mistake to the protruding
sheet of paper leaves no room for doubt that the signature had reference to,
and was the.completion of, the will begun on the first page.
Appeal dismissed and decree of register sustained.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
"Every will" says the 6th section of the Act of April 8th, 1833, "shall be
in writing and unless the person making the same shall be prevented by the
extremity of his last sickness, shall be signed at the end thereof" etc. Mal
colm wrote his will. He also did what he intended to be and supposed to
be the appending of his signature at the end of it. It was at the end of it,
in time. All that he intended to put in the will he had written down, and
the signature was designed to express the completion of it. Perhaps it is
not necessary that the signature should be written after, (in the order of
time) all the rest of the will has been written. At least Sterrett, J. says that,
to show that a portion of the will was written after the signature, in time,
"would be unimportanL" Fosselman v. Elder, 98 Pa. '59. But, if that is
so, a man may begin the will by writing his name at some point on a page,
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and subsequently place above it. or before it a will. The signing might
precede by an hour, day, or year, the writing of the will. It is possible that
the paper incorporated into the will must be in existence when the signature
is appended: Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. 381. Malcolm thought he was writing his name on the same sheet, as that on which he had written the will.
In that he was mistaken. A second sheet lay under the first, and the signature was put on the projecting portion of the second sheet. Suppose this
projecting sheet had contained a will intended to be executed by his wife
and by this accident his name had appeared at the foot of her will. instead of
that of his own. Would the will on the first sheet have been good? Not, if
Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 341 was correctly decided. In that case, Alters will
and his wife's will were lying on the table, awaiting execution. By mi.stake
he put his name to her will, and she to his; and the mistake was not detected
until alter his death. Although his signature was written after, in time, his
will had been written, and was intended and believed by him to be written at
the physical end of it, it was in fact written on another paper, at the end of
another's will. But, if, written on another paper, it was not "at the end" of
his own will. there being a will of another on that paper, it is hard to see
how it would have been "at the end" of his will, had the other paper been
blank.
It is clear that a will may be on several pieces of paper, and that the
signature does not need to appear at the end of each. In Fossehnan v.
Elder, 98 Pa. 159, an unsigned endorsement on an envelope in which a testamentary paper was folded, was deemed a necessary part of the will. Cf.
Wikoff's Appeal, 15 Pa. 281; Ginder v. Farnum, io Pa. 98. How much
then of the will, must the paper contain, on which is the signature? Suppose the will finishes with the sentence, "Witness my hand this 20th Aug.,
1896," and all of the will except the last figures 1896 is on one piece of paper
and 1896 with the signature on another. Is the will valid? Cf. Morrow's
Estate, 20 , Pa. 479. Suppose the testator unexpectdly finds that the will,
written on one piece of paper, completely covers it, without room for a signature, and he places his signature on another piece of paper with intention
that the two shall be read together. Would physical connection of the
pieces before signing be necessary? Or after signing?
The case supposed is one in which the testator is aware that he is
using two pieces of paper, and he intends them to be connected in construction. Would the result be different, if he supposed that they were but one
piece and under this belief, executed the eignature? We cannot. ee that it
should. Although it is then necessary as we believe, to repudiate Alter's
Appeal supra, in order to maintain the soundness of Malcolm's will, we
think this will complies with the act of 1833, and is signed at the end. In
Alter's Appeal a too technical application of the statute transferred to collateral heir's property designed by the testator for his widow.
Had the signature been on the same paper as contained the will, the
testator's intention, in making it, to adopt and complete the will, would be a
matter of mere inference. It would be possible for the signature to have been
written first and without any expectation of being later preceded in space
by a will. In the case before us, we have evidence making it entirely clear
that the signing occurred in immediate sequence to the writing of the tes-
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tamentary words, and with the intention to complete the testamentary act.
It would be a crime to defeat Malcolm's purpose, because it is discovered
that the paper on which he placed his name, was. he not suspecting it, different from that on which ie had written the will.
Appeal dismissed.

HOPKINS VS. BOROUGH OF CARLISLE.
Liability of Borough-Negllgence-Unenorced Ordinance.

statement of the Case appears in the Opinion of the Court.
Rodriguez for the plaintiff.
A borough is responsible for the condition of its streets, whether the
condition is due to its own act, the acts of others, or the operation of nature:
Trickett's Borough Law p. 149; Fuller vs. Young Twp. 130 Pa. 72.
The municipality is under the obligation of erecting guards and placing
lights to protect travelers from injury from any excavations or obstructions
whether made by it or by an individual. And is liable in any case of failure
so to do: Lower Macungie Twp. vs. Merkhopper, 71 Pa. 276.
The fact that one is at the time of the accident violating a statute does
not prevent his recovery of damages if the commission of the illegal act did
not contribute to produce the injury- Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, vol. 15,
p. 465 (i).

Van Scoten for the defendant.
Highways are intended for and devoted to the purpose of public travel

and every person may exercise that right but in a reasonable manner. Due
regard must be had to other rights. Allegheny v. Zimmerman, 65 Pa. 287.
An act cannot be held to be negligent when there is no reasonable

ground for supposing that it would cause injury to anyone: McKee vs.
Harrisburg Traction Co. 211 Pa. 47.
An act prohibiting coasting on sidewalks has been held valid and enforceable: Trickett on Borough Law P. 2oi.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SKINNER, J.:-This is an action against the Borough of Carlisle for
damages sustained by the plaintiff while sledding on the streets. It seems
that the sled of the plaintiff ran into a ditch dug under the direction of the
borough authorities. It is admitted that the plaintiff at the time was violating a borough ordinance which prohibited sledding upon the streets. It appears, however, that this ordinance had never been enforced and it has been
shown that the plaintiff was using due care at the time of the accident.
The first question which confronts us is whether a city or borough is
bound to keep its streets free from incumbrances. The duty imposed upon
all cities and municipalities in regard to their streets and highways is to
keep them safe for ordinary travel. It is negligence for them to leave a
dangerous place on a highway unguarded. In Dougherty v. Phila., 4 W. N.
287., where the city had vacated a street and failed to bar ingress by gate

or fence, and by excavations had rendered it dangerous for travel, the city
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was held liable in damages for the injury occasioned thereby. This rule
has been so long imbedded in the decisions of the various courts of our
State that there can be no doubt as to its validity: 89 Pa. 389; 3 Pa. Dist.
-92; 149 Pa. 221; 4 Luzerne Law Times, N. S. io5; 91 Pa. 226; 34 Pa. 293,
i5o Pa. 145.

It is, however, a question for the jury as to Nhether there were sufficient
guards to protect travelers from sustaining injury at dangerous places. In
other words the jury must decide whethez or not the municipality was negligent. Negligence is a mixed question of law and fact and should usually
be submitted to the jury to find whether proper care has been exercised
under the particular circumstnce's. 91 Pa. 226; 89 Pa. 389; 130 Pa. 72; 74
Pa. 218; Yo2 Pa. 474; 7 Superior Court (Pa.) io9.

The second question which is to be considered is whether the defendant can excuse himself on the ground that the plaintiff was violating a borough ordinance at the time of the accident. The case before us is very
similar to Garman v. Wil~on, iS Weekly Notes 7. In this case a horse was
permitted to run at large on a sidewalk of a public street in Philadelphia,
and injury to goods exposed upon the sidewalk resulted therefrom. Evidence tending to show that the plaintiff violated a city ordinance prohibiting the placing of wares on the pavements of the city was rejected. Also a
party who erects an obstruction in a navigable stream and thereby occasions
injury to another cannot set up as a defense that the plaintiff was unlawfully engaged in worldly employment on Sunday when the injury occurred:
Mohney v. Cools, 26 Pa- 342. In his opinion the learned justice, Lowrie
said: "We should work a confusion of relations and lend a very doubtful
assistance to morality, if we should allow one offender against the law, to
the injury of another, to set off against the plaintiff that he too was a public
offender * * * A man may be punished for getting drunk and riding
furiously along the street, and yet, if under such circumstances, and not because of any carelessness he fall into a ditch, the man who improperly dug
it could have no excuse." We find the rule, that the defendant cannot set
up the wrongs of the plaintiff in cases similar to the one before us, well
established in this and many other states: i8 Weekly Notes 7; 26 Pa. 342;
38 Ga. 199; 23 Howard (V. S. R.) 209; 34 Maine 116; 35 N. H. 277; j28 Mass.
598; 29 Wisconsin, 21.
The able counsel for the defendant has contended that the plaintiff in
the case before us cannot recover because the fact that he was sledding
was the proximate cause of the injury. If this is true, as the plaintiffs
sledding was against a borough ordinance, the plaintiff cannot recover.
However, the sledding was no more the proximate cause of the injury,
than the exposing of the wares was the approximate cause in Gannon v.
Wilson. The ordinance against sledding on the streets had not been enforced and therefore we may assume that the children were accustomed to
sledding upon the streets of the defendant borough. The borough officials
should have foreseen that such an accident was likely to happen and should
have guarded against it.
We are of the opinion therefore, that, if the jury find negligence on the
part of the borough authorities in not sufficiently protecting the ditch, the
plaintiff is entitled to damages for injuries sustained.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The ditch was dug under the direction of the borough authorities. But,
where was it? How deep and wide was it? A gutter along the sidewalk
is a ditch. Was this ditch permanent or temporary? How long had it been;
for what purpose was it made? It is quite imaginable that a ditch might
be built by a borough for a proper purpose, and without negligence. The
evidence presented in the trial court, does not point to negligence, unless
the jury was warranted in inferring negligence from the mere presence of
a ditch whose dimensions, position, object and duration are not indicated.
and from the fact that a sled running into it, tho rider was hurt. These
facts alone would not justify the imputation of negligence to the borough.
To whom does a borough owe a duty with respect to the streets? It
does not insure anybody from hurt from the condition of the streets. It
does insure persons who are properly using the streets, from hurt arising
from such condition thereof as is the result of its own negligence.
If young Hopkins had been jumping into the ditch for exercise or
sport, he would not have been a passenger, to whom the duty of preserving
safe streets is owed. If he had been carelessly running, walking or driving,
he would equally have been beyond the guarantee of the borough's liability.
He was not simply carelessly walking, or runningor driving. He was doing
what was illegal. Sledding endangers other persons in borough streets, and
Carlisle had properly forbidden his act: Law of Boroughs p. 201. Isit not singular that, making a use of the street which is not intended to be made, the
makingof which is positively prohibited, he shotild, nevertheless ask for cQmpensation for the injury that has resulted from that very use? Cf. McCormick v. Township of Washington, i z Pa. 185.
The borough ordinance "had never in fact been enforced". But how
many unpunished infractions of it had there been? How long pince the
ordinance had been enacted? Is a law repealed because people are lax in
visiting penalties upon its violators ? Most laws are often violated without
punishment of offenders, but they are not by that fact repealed.
It is found that Hopkins was observing due care when the accident occurred. Was he sledding in a street that he did not know at night? If he
saw the ditch, did he not take the risk of running into it? It'is somewhat
difficult to realize what the reported finding of due care may mean, unless
it means merely that so far as the actual operation of the sled was concerned,
it was with due care.
The learned court below considars that the sledding was not a proximate cause of the accident. It is not necessary that we should find out
whether it was, or not. Hopkins was sledding, and was hurt. He complains
that there was a neglect by the borough to furnish a street on which he
could sled with safety. As he had no right to sled the borough neglected
no duty in not furnishing him with a sledable street. Perhaps the ditch
should not have been there, and a horseman, or pedestrian driving or walking without negligence, would have been entitled to damages, if hurt by it.
Their right is not the plaintiff's right.
The learned cotfrt below refers to Garman v. Wilson, r8 N. N. C. 7.
The plaintiff there did not ask for damages from the city, because it did
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not keep the sidewalk or gutter in fit conditi.in for his use. The city owed
him no such duty, and he could have recovered nothing for the alleged
violation of it.
Judgment reversed.
KEELY VS. THRIMBLE.
Lateral Support-Easements-Damages.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Keely owned a house and lot, next to that of Thrimble. The remoter
side of Keely's lot was 12 feet higher than the nearer side, and Thrimble's
lot likewise inclined laterally, so that its side further from Keely's was io
feet lower than at the dihision line. The lots were 50 feet wide. Keely's
house was 30 feet wide, its eastern side being on the division line. It was
of brick three stories in height Thrimble desiring to reduce the grade of
his lot to that of the street running before it and Keely's, excavated it so as
to take from the division side 7 feet in thickness of earth. The result was
that Keely's house slipped upon Thrimble's lot and was utterly destroyed,
to his loss of $5,ooo. The falling in of the house could not have been avoided
by the utmost care in removing the earth. The house might have been
shored up by buttresses on Thrimble's land but these would have cost
money and occupied a portion of his land. This is an action for damages.
Rodriguez for the plaintiff.
Damages having resulted from the removal of the natural support of
the land, defendant is liable. t8 A. & E. Ency. of Law 542; Wier's Appeal,
St Pa. 203. Plaintiff may recover all consequential damages resulting from
such injury. i8 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 543. It was defendant's duty to
protect the structure. Spohn v. Dives, 174 Pa 474.
Van Scoten for the defendant.
Recovery will not be allowed where building is thrown down by reason
of excavations on adjoining land in absence if improper motive and of carelessness. Richart v. Scott, 7 Watts 460; McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 153.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SMITH, J.:-This is an action to recover damage for the destruction of plaintiff's house, alleged to have been caused by the violation of
the plaintiff's right to lateral support of his land due to the defendant's excavating so near the division line and to such depth that plaintiff's house
"slipped and was utterly destroyed."
The defendant was under a duty to support the plaintiff's land in
its natural state, this being one of the incidents of ownership of real
property, but this duty on the part of defendant does not extend to
buildings erected on the lnd but only to land in its natural state: McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 154; Tiedeman on Real Property, p. 59o; Kerr on
Injunctions p. 222; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199; Bigelow on Torts,
p. 283. The right to lateral support of land in its natural condition does
not depend upon grant or prescription but the right to lateral support of
buildings can only be acquired in England by one or the other of these two
methods. The courts of this country have never recognized the English
doctrine of right to lateral support by prescription but such right can only
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be acquired by grant: Biglow on Torts, p. ,85. It is not alleged by the
plaintiff that there was a right to support acquired by grant.
The facts in the case repel any presumption of negligence on the part
of defendant in excavating. In the absence of a right to lateral support acquired by grant, and in the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant there can be no recovery for the damage to plaintiff's house: McGettigan v. Potts, supra.
+n so far as the rirhts of plaintiff were violated by the damage to the
land in its natural state, he may maintain the action and recover damages,
the measure of such damage being the diminution in the value of the land
by reason of the filling in of the soil: McGettigan v. Potts, supra. Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The question in this case is whether Keely had an easement on the land
of Thrimble in virtue of which Thrimble's was bound either to be allowed
indefinitely to remain in its present condition, or to submit to permanent
occupancy by buttresses, or shores.
The judges have invented an easement of this general sort, in favor of
one piece of land against another, for the protection of the former from slid.
ing over or caving in, on account of the removal of lateral support, when
such sliding over or caving in, is not due in any degree to the weight of a
building or other artificial structure. It is not easy to realize the value of
such an easement, under such limitations. Land in cities and towns is of
little value except for the reception of buildings, and since buildings must
have weight, to hold that there is no redress for a caving in due in any degree to this weight, is to reduce, almost to zero, the value of the easement
And, even if a jury should persuade itself that the caving in was not in any
degree due to the weight of the building, it could not allow compensation
for the damage to the building. The other damage is usually insignificant
The judges have been willing to give a little lien on neighbor land, but
not a big lien. A and B, owning adjacent lots may so far restrain each
other, that neither can excavate on his own lot except under the condition
that he does not disturb the ground of the other, or that, if he does he com.
pensates him. But, if A desiring to improve his lot builds a house on it, he
has no such lien as precludes B from making such changes in his lot, as
shall cause the house to fall, provided that B is not negligent or malicious,
and that there would have been no caving in of the surface, had the house
not been upon it.
Thrimble's desire to reduce the grade of his lot was legitimate. Had
Keely not built his house, he could have done it without responsibility, being
careful, for anything else than the injury to the soil from its displacement
resulting from its natural weight, and the abstraction of the lateral support.
If Keely could by building the house compel Thrimble to leave his lot unchanged in grade, or practically pay for Keely's house, he would be taking
from Thrimble a large part of the value of his ownership.
The law is content, under these relations, to compel Thrimble to exercise good faith and due care, and these he has exercised. Care does not
require his furnishing of buttresses, permanently to occupy a portion of his
land. Cf. 17 P. and L. Dig. of Decisions, 30,000.
Judgment affirmed.

